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The account of fictional truth proposed by David Lewis in his seminal 1978 paper “Truth in Fiction”
remains of central importance to much contemporary discussion of this issue — namely, how we should
analyse what is, so to speak, ‘true in a fiction’. Despite this, Lewis says relatively little about fictional
names as such, nor have Lewis’s views on fictional names received much scholarly attention — surprising,
given the extent to which the issues of fictional truth and fictional names overlap. In this paper I argue that
Lewis’s account of fictional truth forces us to adopt an account of fictional names as non-rigid designators,
whose reference is fixed satisfactionally at a given world. However, as such, I argue that Lewis’s account
is vulnerable to challenges analogous to Kripke’s criticisms of classical descriptivism: namely, that this
account is seemingly incompatible with intuitively coherent patterns of ‘counter-fictional’ reasoning.
1 Introduction
For as long as names have been considered a worthy subject of philosophical inquiry
— that is, at least, since Frege — ctional names have posed a problem: we can say seem-
ingly true things with ctional names, which seemingly do not refer to any individual (at
least, not to any ordinary individual). How can this be?1
The solutions to this problem bifurcate along the lines of this tension. In order
to resolve the problem, we could allow that ctional names do (or, at least, can) refer —
but then to what do they refer? Alternatively, we could reject the possibility of saying true
things with ctional names — but then how are we to explain our seeming ability to do
just that?
In this paper Iwill trace the route through this garden of forking paths followed by
David Lewis in his seminal paper “Truth in Fiction,”2 pausing briey to justify his choices
at each junction. I will then consider how the commitments Lewis makes lay the ground-
work for a plausible account of ctional names. However, I argue that such an account
faces some robust diculties. I leave it open to the reader to decide whether, in light of
these diculties, we ought to prefer to continue down this path.
1Gottlob Frege, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” Zeitschri für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100 (1892): 25–50. Translated as
“On Sense and Reference” in Translations from the PhilosophicalWritings of Gottlob Frege, ed. and trans. Max Black and Peter Geach
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
2David Lewis, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1978): 37-46, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009693.
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2 A Problem of Fictional Names
We can say seemingly true things with ctional names. Consider this simple comprehen-
sion question on Shakespeare’s Hamlet:
(1)Hamlet is Danish.
This sentence seems true. If a student, say, were to utter (1), in the context of a
discussion about Hamlet, we should (plausibly) take them to have said something true.3
If we follow the surface grammar of (1), wemay take it as having the grammatical
form of a typical subject-predicate sentence: ascribing a property— being Danish— to an
individual, referred to bymeans of a proper name, ‘Hamlet’. A standard truth-conditional
analysis of such a sentencewould hold that it is true if and only if the referent of the name
satises the property expressed by the predicate.
However, it is tempting to suggest that, almost axiomatically, ctional names like
‘Hamlet’ do not refer to anyone — if they did, they would not be genuine ctional names.4
A standard treatment of proper names would hold that a proper name (on an occasion of
use) refers to an individual by virtue of being part of a name-using practice, originating
in that individual being dubbed with that name.5 However, almost by denition, our use
of the name ‘Hamlet’ did not originate in some person being dubbed with the name. We
might be tempted to say, then, that Shakespeare “just made up the name:”6 it does not
refer to any individual; it is an empty name.
We have an obvious tension here: if ‘Hamlet’ does not refer to anyone, it cannot be
that the referent of ‘Hamlet’ satises the property expressed by the predicate ‘is Danish’;
so (1) cannot be true.
This tension can be spelled out in three claims:
(A) The sentence ‘Hamlet is Danish’ is true.
(B) The name ‘Hamlet’ does not refer to any individual.
(C) The sentence ‘Hamlet is Danish’ is true i: (i) ‘Hamlet’ refers to some indi-
vidual; and, (ii) the referent of ‘Hamlet’ satises the property expressed by ‘is
Danish’.
All three claims are intuitively plausible; however, as I hope is clear, they cannot
all be held in conjunction.
3Graham Priest, “Sylvan’s Box: a Short Story and Ten Morals,” Notre Dame journal of Formal Logic 38, no. 4 (1997): 573-582. This use
of a ‘comprehension test’ is inspired by Priest.
44 We assume here and throughout that ‘Hamlet’ is a paradigmatic example of a genuine ctional name.
5Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1981). This standard treatment follows a rough causal picture of
reference, as popularised by Kripke.
6David Kaplan, “Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice,” inApproaches to Natural Language, ed. JaakkoHintikka (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973),
505.
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This tension is not unique to the name ‘Hamlet’. Fictional names pose a general
problem for semantic analysis, as we can use them to ascribe properties to ctional char-
acters; making (seemingly) true claims, despite their (seemingly) failing to refer.
3 Do Fictional Names Refer?
Many suggested resolutions to this tension start by rejectingB, holding that ctional names
like ‘Hamlet’ do refer — though not to ordinary esh-and-blood persons. Such solutions
may (broadly) be described as ‘realist’, insofar as they hold that — ontologically speaking
— there are such things as ctional characters, and that ctional names refer to these
characters.7 However, we should then ask: if ctional characters are ‘real’, and ctional
names refer to them, what sort of thing are they —metaphysically speaking? Within this
broad ontological ‘realist’ position, there is signicant divergence in answering thismeta-
physical question.8
One common ‘realist’ approach is to follow theMeinongian line that ctional char-
acters are non-existent individuals.9 Parsons summarises such a position:
“Sherlock Holmes, for example, is an object that is a detective, solves crimes,
..., and doesn’t exist. His nonexistence doesn’t prevent him from having (in the
actual world) quite ordinary properties, such as being a detective.”10
This, however, is chiey a negative thesis — ctional characters are not existent.
We should be inclined to ask the Meinongian for some positive metaphysical thesis to
supplement this claim. Again, suggestions on such positive theses diverge. Parsons, for
instance, holds that ctional characters (qua non-existents) are “concrete correlates of
sets of properties;”11 in contrast, Zalta and Stokke maintain that ctional characters are
“roles” or “individual concepts,” specied by sets of properties.12
If these suggestions are already beginning to look too metaphysically obscure for
our tastes, we might prefer to backtrack a little, and consider an alternative realist line.
The most common such alternative would, likely, follow the thesis that ctional charac-
ters are abstract individuals. Again, such a thesis is primarily negative — ctional charac-
ters are not concrete — and ought to be supplemented with some positive metaphysical
7However, in order to knit with our intuitions, such ctional characters must be dierent in kind to ordinary esh-and-blood
people.
8Amie Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Thomasson draws this distinction
between the ontological and metaphysical issues of ctional characters: ‘are there such things as ctional characters?’; and (if so), ‘what
kind of thing is a ctional character?’.
99 Fred Kroon and Alberto Voltolini, “Fictional Entities,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/ctional-entities; Andreas Stokke, “Fictional Names and Individual Concepts,”
Synthese (2020): 1-31. Per Kroon and Voltolini, and Stokke, we should be careful about attributing any of these views too stringently to
Meinong himself. Rather, we say that these views are broadly “Meinongian.”
10Terence Parsons, “Fregean theories of ctional objects,” Topoi 1 (1982): 81.
11Parsons; Kroon and Voltolini.
12Edward N. Zalta, Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983); Andreas Stokke, “Fictional
Names and Individual Concepts.”
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claim. Thomasson is a forceful defender of one such thesis;13 arguing that ctional char-
acters are artifacts: “created, dependent abstracta present in the actual world”;14 “created
objects dependent on such entities as authors and stories.”15
I will not consider the relative merits of these metaphysical options here. There
are, however, as noted byMartin and Schotch, general reasons to bewary of adopting any
such ontologically realist line.16 For one, all such lines are ontologically costly, requiring
that we accept an ontology containing not only ordinary, concrete, existent individuals,
but some other sort(s) of individuals too (e.g. non-existents, or abstracta). If available, a so-
lution to the problemwhich did not require such ontological commitmentsmight be con-
sidered theoretically preferable. Second, even granting such ontological commitments,
we may (reasonably) be sceptical of the legitimacy of attributing ordinary properties —
such as being a detective, or being prince of Denmark— to these ‘metaphysically-other’ in-
dividuals. Such attributions, however, are necessary to preserve the intuitive truth-value
of sentences like (1).17
Considering the thorny issueswhich lie in store, shouldwe venture down the real-
ist path, wemay be inclined to choose an alternative ‘anti-realist’ track. The starting point
for any such track would be to uphold B — our original intuition, that ctional names do
not refer (to any kind of individual). Since this ‘anti-realism’ amounts to a dismissal of
the ontological question, the dicult metaphysical questions which troubled the realist
simply do not arise. However, by upholding B, the anti-realist is forced to conclude that
(1) is not true (at least, not strictly speaking).
What Lewis attempts to show,18 rst of all, is that there is a path available to the
anti-realist which allows them to uphold ¬ A and B, and yet give a satisfying explanation
of the intuitive truth of (1). He argues that it is available to us to say that, although (1) is
not strictly true, it can be used to say something true. More precisely, he claims, when
someone uses or utters the phrase “Hamlet is Danish,” we may (in certain contexts) take
them to have implicitly asserted, not (1), but the more complex sentence:
(2) In Hamlet, Hamlet is Danish.
We draw an implicit distinction here between what a speaker utters — the precise
words they use— and what they assert — very roughly, the point they express.
In eect, the addition of the prex ‘In Hamlet. . . ’ makes explicit that the claim
being asserted ismetactional: it does not concern what is true simplicite, but rather what
13Amie Thomasson, “Fiction, Modality and Dependent Abstracta,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the
Analytic Tradition 84, no. 2 (1996): 295-320; “Speaking of Fictional Characters,” Dialectica 57, no. 2 (2003): 205-223.
14Thomasson, “Fiction, Modality and Dependent Abstracta”, 296.
15Thomasson, 301. For others, see: John Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” New Literary History 6, no.
2 (1975): 319-332; Peter van Inwagen, “Creatures of Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14, no. 4 (1977): 299–308,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009682; Nathan Salmon, “Nonexistence,” Noûs 32, no. 3 (1998): 277–319; Saul Kripke, Reference and
Existence: The John Locke Lectures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
16Robert M. Martin and Peter K. Schotch, “The Meaning of Fictional Names,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Phi-
losophy in the Analytic Tradition 26, no. 5 (1974): 378.
17Kripke, Reference and Existence. Kripke maintains such a view: broadly, that ctional characters are abstract objects, but that —
as such — they are not eligible to satisfy ordinary properties such as being Danish, or being a detective; instead they satisfy ctional-
analogues of ordinary properties, such as being ctionally-Danish, or being a ctional detective.
18Lewis, "Truth in Fiction."
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is ‘true-in-Hamlet’.19 Though (1) is not true simpliciter, it is true-in-Hamlet; or true, when
situated within the scope of the prex ‘In Hamlet. . . ’.
Thismay be used as a general strategy for understandingmetactional discourse:
we may take seemingly straightforward utterances as (abbreviated) metactional asser-
tions— implicitly prexed with an operator of the form ‘In such-and-such a ction. . . ’ (or,
a ction-operator).20
This path leaves us with the following commitments:
(¬A) The sentence ’Hamlet is Danish’ is not true.
(B) The name ‘Hamlet’ does not refer to any individual.
(C) The sentence ‘Hamlet is Danish’ is true i: (i) ‘Hamlet’ refers to some indi-
vidual; and, (ii) the referent of ‘Hamlet’ satises the property expressed by ‘is
Danish’.
(D) An utterance or use of the phrase “Hamlet is Danish” may (in some contexts)
be taken as an (abbreviated) assertion of the sentence ‘In Hamlet, Hamlet is
Danish’.21
(E) The sentence ‘In Hamlet, Hamlet is Danish’ is true.
4 How should we analyse (2)?
The question which then presents itself is: how should we analyse (2)? Since we are com-
mitted to the claim that (2) is true, what are its truth-conditions?
4.1 How should we analyse the fiction-operator, ’InHamlet...’?
We may begin by considering the ction-operator, ‘In Hamlet. . . ’. As should be clear on
consideration, the operator ‘In Hamlet. . . ’ is not truth-functional: we cannot determine
the truth-value of a sentence ‘InHamlet, φ’ as a function of the truth-value of the embed-
ded sentence φ.
19Stokke: 2. I borrow this concept of metactional discourse from Stokke: “On its metactional use [a sentence] is used to say
something about what is true in [a] story.”
20Moves along these lines abound in the literature. See: Martin and Schotch; Gregory Currie, “Fictional Truth,” Philosophical Stud-
ies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 50, no. 2 (1986): 195-212; Alex Byrne, “Truth in ction: The story
continued,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71, no. 1 (1993): 24-35; John F. Phillips, “Truth and Inference in Fiction,” Philosophical
Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 94, no. 3 (1999): 273-293, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320938;
Diane Proudfoot, “Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (2006): 9-40; Stacie Friend, “The great bee-
tle debate: a study in imagining with names,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 153,
no. 2 (2011): 183-211; Stokke.
21Lewis: 38. How are we to decide when an utterance is to be taken as a metactional assertion, implicitly prexed by some ction-
operator? As Lewis says, “context, content, and common sense will usually resolve the ambiguity.” Comprehension tests, like that
with which we began, are useful for necessitating metactional discourse.
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Lewis’s suggestion starts from the point of regarding ‘In Hamlet. . . ’ as a modal
operator. This analysis allows Lewis to treat metactional discourse from within the (al-
ready developed) framework of a possible world semantics, of which he is a noted advocate.
The key tenet of such a framework is that modal discourse — about possibility and ne-
cessity — should be understood and interpreted as discourse about possible worlds, and
possible individuals.
Lewis subscribes to the view that modal discourse involving the notions of pos-
sibility and necessity is inherently opaque (without clear truth-conditions or standards of
validity). He holds that this opaqueness can only be dissolved by giving truth-conditional
analyses ofmodal sentences in terms of quantication over possible worlds.22 In particu-
lar, the modal operators ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ should be translated as universal and
existential quantiers, ranging over a domain of possible worlds.
Similarly, Lewis suggests that ction-operators should be interpreted as “relative
necessity operators,” andanalysed as “restricteduniversal quantiers overpossibleworlds.”23
More intuitively, the ction-operator ‘In Hamlet. . . ’ serves to identify some relevant do-
main of possible worlds; and the truth-value of a sentence of the form ‘In Hamlet, φ’ is
determined by the truth-value of the embedded sentence ϕ at each world in the relevant
domain.
This analysis outlines an approach for dening truth-conditions for sentences
within the scope of ction-operators. The Lewisian suggestion can be stated as follows:
(F) For any sentence ϕ ‘In Hamlet, φ’ is true i φ is true at each of some set of
possible worlds (“this set being somehow determined by Hamlet”).24
This approachhas a couple of obvious advantages. Firstly, there is something intu-
itively satisfying about identifying truth-in-Hamletwith truth at somepossibleworlds. We
oen have recourse to talk about ‘the world of the ction’, or of storytelling as a ‘world-
building’ exercise. Lewis’s approach directly echoes this picture.25 Secondly, analysing
‘In Hamlet. . . ’ as a restricted universal quantier over possible worlds allows discourse
about truth-in-Hamlet to be subsumed into a general possible world semantics, with clear
and denite standards of valid inference.
In addition to ¬A – E, we now nd ourselves committed to the additional claim:
(G) For any sentence ϕ, ‘In Hamlet, φ’ is true i φ is true at each of some set of
possible worlds (which we may denote ‘4’).
22David Lewis, “Anselm and Actuality,” in Philosophical Papers Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 10. “The standards
of validity for modal reasoning have long been unclear; they become clear only when we provide a semantic analysis of modal logic
by reference to possible worlds and to possible things therein.”
23Lewis, “Truth in Fiction:” 39.
24Lewis: 38. We ought really to specify a type of modality here, in virtue of which a world is possible. It is clear from Lewis’s work
that the relevant type is logical or metaphysicalmodality. As such, when we describe a world as ‘possible’, we should understand that
as meaning ‘logically ormetaphysically possible’.
25In general, ctions do not specify enough to determine a single possible world as ‘the world of the ction’. Worlds are complete—
they settle every question. As such, there are otherwise identical worlds, diering only in Ophelia’s blood type. Which of these is the
world of Hamlet? It seems arbitrary to choose between them.
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4.2 How should we analyse the embedded sentence, (1)?
The analysis of the operator ‘In Hamlet. . . ’ given in G, in conjunction with our existing
commitment E, imply a further commitment:
(H) The sentence ‘Hamlet is Danish’ is true at each possible world in the set4.
As should be apparent, in order to make sense of this claim, we must think of (1)
not as having a single truth-value, but as only having a truth-value at a world (or, relative
to a state of aairs).26 For instance, we may say that, even though (1) is false at the actual
world (denoted ‘@’), it may be true at some other possible world, or at each of some set of
worlds.
However, in order to allow the truth-value of (1) to vary between worlds, we must
also relativise its truth-conditions to a world. As such, as (1) contains a singular term and
a predicate, we must also relativise the relations of reference and property-satisfaction to
worlds.
In this vein, drawing on the standard analysis of (1) given in C, we may say that
(1) is true at a world w if and only if the referent of ‘Hamlet’ at w satises the property
expressed by ‘is Danish’ at w. This states a further commitment:
(I) The sentence ‘Hamlet is Danish’ is true at a world w i: (i) ‘Hamlet’ refers to
some individual at w; and, (ii) the referent of ‘Hamlet’ at w satises the prop-
erty expressed by ‘Danish’ at w.
From H and I, follows a further commitment:
(J) For any possible world w in the set4: (i) ‘Hamlet’ refers to some individual at
w; and, (ii) the referent of ‘Hamlet’ at w satises the property expressed by ‘is
Danish’ at w.
5 How should we analyse the reference-conditions
of ‘Hamlet’?
This commitment raises a further question: what are the (world-relative) reference-xing
conditions for ‘Hamlet’: what conditionsmust obtain for ‘Hamlet’ to refer to an individual
(at a world)?
26Strictly speaking, we should also relativise the truth of (2) to a world, bymeans of an accessibility relation. Lewis does not consider
this: he is only concerned (as we will be here) with the semantics of ction-operators with respect to the actual world.
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5.1 Ordinary Proper Names
In many ways, ‘Hamlet’ looks and behaves like an ordinary proper name. The standard
treatment of such ‘ordinary’ proper names (viz. reference and modality), popularised by
Kripke,27 comprises two elements. First, the reference of an ‘ordinary’ proper name (on
an occasion of use) is determined at the actual world, by means of something like the
causal picture of reference we considered earlier. Second, when considered with respect to
other possible worlds, an ‘ordinary’ proper name refers at any world to the individual to
whom it refers at the actual world: ‘ordinary’ proper names are rigid designators (across
possibleworlds). (AsKripkedemonstrated, this property of rigidity is central to our ability
to engage in modal reasoning using proper names.)28
This property of rigidity can be spelled out in the following claim:
(K) For any ordinary proper name ‘α’, any world w, and any individual x: ‘α’ refers
to x at w if and only if ‘α’ refers to x at @.
As Kaplan observes,29 a natural corollary of this claim is as follows:
(L) For any ordinary proper name ‘α’: if ‘α’ does not refer to any individual at @,
then ‘α’ does not refer to any individual at any world.
As such, if we were to treat ‘Hamlet’ as an ordinary proper name (qua rigid desig-
nator), then it follows, from B and L, that ‘Hamlet’ does not refer to any individual at any
possible world. The only way to reconcile this conclusion with J, would be to hold that
the set 4 is empty. However, this conclusion, in conjunction with F, would make every
sentence vacuously true-in-Hamlet.
Seemingly, then, theonlyway to reconcile ourLewisian analysis of ction-operators
as modal operators, with an interpretation of ctional names as rigid designators, would
be to completely obscure the distinction between ctional truths and ctional falsities.30
As such, in order to hold on to our existing commitments, we must treat ctional
names dierently from ‘ordinary’ proper names (on the standard Kripkean treatment): a
move which raises a suspicion of ad hoc-ness.
Moreover, realist approaches are, at least in theory, compatible with an interpre-
tation of ctional names as rigid designators. Such approaches, therefore, seem to consti-
tute amore promising option for providing a uniform semantical account of ctional and
27Kripke, Naming and Necessity
28David Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantied Modal Logic,” The Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 5 (1968): 113-126. This concept of
rigidity relies on a primitive notion of trans-world identity for individuals. Lewis is critical of this notion, preferring to explicate talk
of transworld identity by means of his Counterpart Theory, a primary tenet of which is that no individual can inhabit more than one
world. However, in “Truth in Fiction” he adopts the conventional language of transworld identity, which we use here.
29Kaplan, 502
30It is important to note that this is simply a consequence of Lewis’s analysis of ction-operators asmodal operators, and of ctional
names as being used meaningfully within the scope of these modals. It does not depend on the ner points of Lewis’s analyses, and
applies equally to any way he might esh out the restriction on possible worlds,4.
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‘ordinary’ names. Such uniformity would, plausibly, be considered a theoretical value.
Thomasson,31 and Adams, et al.32, both attempt to oer such uniform accounts.
5.2 Descriptivism
Given that, as we have seen, a Lewisian analysis of ction-operators as modal operators
is essentially incompatible with an interpretation of ctional names as rigid-designators,
we nd ourselves in need of an alternative analysis of ctional names: one which assigns
them non-rigid (world-relative) reference-xing conditions.
One potentially attractive suggestion might be to let the reference of the name
‘Hamlet’ be xed (at a world) satisfactionally, by the descriptions given of Hamlet inHam-
let. Approaches along these lines are given byMartin and Schotch, and Currie,33 amongst
others.
With some degree of idealisation, we can extract from the text ofHamlet some set
of attributes, relations and deeds ascribed to the character Hamlet. Such a set might in-
clude the following: ‘is Danish’; ‘is a prince’; ‘is slain by a poisoned blade’, etc. Intuitively,
we can regard such a set of descriptions as constructing a specication, or a ‘sketch’, of
the character Hamlet. A very general outline of a descriptivist approach to resolving the
reference-conditions of ‘Hamlet’ might, then, be to say that ‘Hamlet’ refers to an individ-
ual at a world if and only if that individual matches this ‘sketch’ of Hamlet at that world.
There are numerous ways this broad conditionmay be eshed-out. Wemight say,
for instance, that ‘Hamlet’ refers to an individual at a world if that individual satises
all the descriptions given of Hamlet in Hamlet at that world; or some majority of these
descriptions; or best matches the inferred ‘sketch’ (of the individuals available at that
world). We shall not worry about this here.
A version of this descriptivist suggestion can be stated broadly as follows (with the
necessary addition of a uniqueness condition):
(M) For any world w, and any individual x: ‘Hamlet’ refers to x at w if and only if x
uniquely satises all (or most) of the descriptions given of Hamlet in Hamlet.
This suggestion, however, has a rather disquieting consequence — the observa-
tion of which is due to Kripke.34 Consider: we can perfectly well imagine discovering that
some individual actually existed, who uniquely satised all or most of the descriptions
given of Hamlet inHamlet. In Lewis’s words, this imagined individual “had the attributes,
stood in the relations, and did the deeds” ascribed to Hamlet in Hamlet. Would this indi-
vidual then be Hamlet? Would the name ‘Hamlet’ — as we use it — refer to him?
31Amie Thomasson, “The Reference of Fictional Names,” Kriterion 6 (1993): 3-12, http://www.kriterion-journal-of-
philosophy.org/kriterion/issues/Kriterion-1993-06/Kriterion-1993-06-03-12-thomasson.pdf.
32Fred Adams, Gary Fuller and Robert Stecker, “The Semantics of Fictional Names,” Pacic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997): 128-148.
33Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
34Kripke, Naming and Necessity.
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If we hold a condition like M, and allow the reference of ‘Hamlet’ to be xed sat-
isfactionally (at a world), then we should have to answer in the armative. Such an indi-
vidual would, indeed, be Hamlet. Our name ‘Hamlet’ would refer to him. This, however,
may not be a welcome conclusion. Kripke and Lewis both nd it intolerable.35 Neverthe-
less, there is no absolute consensus on this claim, with Martin and Schotch, for instance,
who advocate for something like the satisfactional account just given, opting to bite the
bullet in the face of this Kripkean challenge.
5.3 A Lewisian Hybrid
Lewis oers a further alternative to these two treatments. His view is, in essence, ahybrid,
holding, with the descriptivist, that ctional names are non-rigid, but following Kripke in
denying that matching the ‘sketch’ of Hamlet is sucient for being Hamlet (or being the
referent of the name ‘Hamlet’).36
His suggestion canbest be explainedandmotivatedby consideringwhat onemight
take to be wrong with the previous descriptivist suggestion. Let us consider the problem
again: we can well imagine discovering that some individual actually existed matching
the ‘sketch’ of Hamlet. Would this individual be Hamlet?
“Surely not!”, says Lewis.37 But why not? Lewis’s reaction, I believe, stems from an
implicit assumption of a broadly causal picture of reference, whereby names refer to indi-
viduals (on an occasion of use) in virtue of being part of a name-using practice originating
in that individual being dubbed with the name.
As Kaplan says, however, in the case of ctional names, this is simply not the
case.38 The name ‘Hamlet’, as we use it, does not refer to any individual, because it does
not originate in some individual being dubbed with the name — rather, Shakespeare just
made it up. The possibility of a Hamlet-doppelgänger is irrelevant: if our name ‘Hamlet’
did not originate in their being dubbed with the name, then the name does not refer to
them.
We can co-opt the metaphor of the sketch here, to good eect. Just as a literal
sketch is not a sketch of a particular individual by virtue of that individual bearing a like-
ness to the sketch, so someone is not the referent of our name ‘Hamlet’ in virtue ofmatch-
ing the ‘sketch’. A sketch is of an individual in virtue of bearing some causal, intentional
relationship to that individual. Similarly, an individual is the referent of a name, like
‘Hamlet’, in virtue of some bearing causal, intentional relation to the name.39
On these grounds, Lewis, as I read him, would hold that we can imagine discov-
ering that Hamlet really existed; or that the name ‘Hamlet’, as we use it, does refer to an
35Kripke, Naming and Necessity; Lewis, “Truth in Fiction.”
36Lewis says relatively little about ctional names as such. My reading of him here draws primarily from his reections on ctions
being “told as known fact.”
37Lewis: 39.
38Kaplan, 505
39Kripke uses a similar metaphor in motivating his causal picture.
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actual person. Consider: we can imagine discovering that Shakespeare didnotwriteHam-
let as a work of ction, but as a factual biography of a real Danish prince and his tragic
demise. We can imagine that some individual actually existed who “had the attributes,
stood in the relations, and did the deeds” ascribed in Hamlet to Hamlet and that Shake-
speare wrote the story Hamlet about this individual. We should be inclined to say, then,
that our use of the name ‘Hamlet’ is part of a name-using practice originating in this in-
dividual being dubbed with the name — either by Shakespeare, or previous to his usage.
Such a scenario, we assume, is not actual; but it is conceivable, and therefore de-
scribes a possible world — a possible world where the story Hamlet is told, just as it is
at the actual world, but where it is “told as known fact.”40 This, roughly, then, is Lewis’s
suggestion:
(N) For any world w, and any individual x: ’Hamlet’ refers to x at w i Hamlet is
truly told about x at w.41
There is reason to be sceptical of such a hybrid view. Lewis concedes, as hismodal
analysis requires of him, that ctional names are non-rigid. They are, as such, distinctly
unlike ‘ordinary’ propernames, at least in theirmodal prole. His rejectionof thedescrip-
tivist suggestion, however, seems to be rooted in a tacit subscription to the sort of causal
picture of reference which Kripke endorses for proper names. What may be a little un-
clear to us is, if Lewis already distinguishes between ctional and ordinary names with
respect to rigidity, why should we credit the analogy with regards their actual reference-
xing conditions?
6 A Further Problem
A further problem emerges here, threatening both the descriptivist and the Lewisian
lines. Wemay observe that, despite their dierences in content, the reference-xing con-
ditions given by M and N share the same formal structure:
(O) For any world w, and any individual x: ‘Hamlet’ refers to x at w i x uniquely
satises some condition ξ at w.
Both conditions are, in essence, satisfactional. However, as such, they are both
vulnerable to particular criticisms, analogous to those Kripke makes of classical descrip-
tivism.42 In defending his rigid designation thesis, Kripke argues that certain coherent
patterns of modal reasoning are fundamentally incompatible with a treatment (per clas-
sical descriptivism) of ordinary proper names as disguised denite descriptions. For ex-
ample, we may coherently reason (modally) about Aristotle not writing the Nicomachean
40Lewis: 40.
41Lewis relies here on a notion of trans-world identity for stories — that one and the same story should be told at dierent worlds
as ction and as known fact. As he admits, he does not give clear criteria for this identity.
42Kripke, Naming and Necessity.
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Ethics, or about Gödel not authoring the incompleteness theorems. However, if the ref-
erence of ‘Aristotle’ were xed (partly) by the description ‘the author of the Nicomachean
Ethics’, it would follow that the sentence:
(3) Aristotle wrote the Nicomachean Ethics.
is a necessary truth: true at all possible worlds. This is plainly inadmissible.
An analogous objection is available here, against satisfactional theories of c-
tional names: if we let the reference of a ctional name be xed by a description, then
intuitively coherent patterns of “counter-ctional reasoning,” as Friend calls it,43 come
out as automatically false.
For example, we may hypothesise about what might have happened, had Hamlet
attempted to resolve his feudwith Claudius by less clandestinemeans;44 we conjecture as
to whether Frodo Baggins making more liberal use of the Great Eagles would have expe-
dited his journey to Mordor, or whether it would have disclosed his mission to Sauron.45
These conjectures are perfectly coherent. In fact, they are a key part of how we engage
with ction. Students in literature classes are not only expected to answer simple compre-
hension questions, but to be able to engage in genuine discussion about ctional might-
have-beens.
However, if we hold, along the descriptivist line, that the references of ctional
names are xed by the set of descriptions given of the character in the ction, then sen-
tences like:
(4)Hamlet’s feud drives him to insanity.
should be taken as necessary truths — since, by denition, there can be no possi-
ble worlds where the referent of the name ‘Hamlet’ is not driven to insanity.
By a similar token, if we follow the Lewisian hybrid line, and hold that, at any
world w, ‘Hamlet’ refers to an individual x if and only if Hamlet is truly told about x at
w, then we should (plausibly) also take (4) as a necessary truth — since Hamlet cannot be
truly told of an individual who is not driven to insanity.
Seemingly, then, such satisfactional theories of ctional names are fundamentally
at odds with our ability to engage in coherent and signicant counter-ctional reasoning.
Resolutions to this tension may be available, but it is no easy task.
43Friend: 189.
44James D. Carney, “Fictional Names,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 32, no. 4
(1977): 384.
45Tom Schoonen and Franz Berto, “Reasoning About Fiction,” (Preprint version), 2018, https://tomschoonen.com/content/1-
research/schoonen-berto-2018-reasoning-about-ction.pdf.
Aporia Vol. 21 49
7 Conclusion
The commitments deriving from the Lewisian analysis of ction-operators force us to
consider the issue of the reference-xing conditions for the name ‘Hamlet’. We dismissed
the possibility of treating ‘Hamlet’ on the model of ordinary proper names, holding in-
stead that ctional names must be non-rigid designators, in order to cohere with our
modal analysis of ction-operators. We considered a possible descriptivist solution, tak-
ing the reference of ‘Hamlet’ to be xed satisfactionally by the descriptions given of Ham-
let inHamlet. However, we saw that taking such a line would lead to a potentially unpalat-
able conclusion. In light of this, we considered a hybrid of the previous two positions: an
alternative which I think best represents the position Lewis takes in “Truth in Fiction”.
However, we raised concerns that this hybrid might be less a best-of-both option than a
confused amalgam.
We also noted a further problem aecting both the descriptivist approach and the
Lewisian hybrid view, on the model of Kripke’s criticisms of descriptivism: namely, that
these approaches seem fundamentally at odds with our ability to engage in seemingly
coherent counter-ctional reasoning. How serious is this problem? I leave this question
open. The reader may decide, given the balance of commitments required to pursue this
anti-realist line, whether this line is still preferable to the realist alternative.
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